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Creating the Enemy, Constructing the Threat 
The Diffusion of Repression against the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East 
 
 
Introduction 
Scholarship on the international dimensions of authoritarianism has taken a new 
dimension with the increasing interest in the diffusion of autocratic policies and ideas, 
which has gained academic currency. While the literature has identified some 
mechanisms of autocratic diffusion, it has so far failed to specify why, and under which 
conditions, these mechanisms lead to diffusion. The literature almost exclusively focuses 
on “positive” cases where autocratic ideas and policies spread successfully. There are, 
however, counterintuitive cases where actors do not adopt particular autocratic policies 
despite the presence of causal mechanisms conducive for diffusion. 1  This article tackles 
this often-unexplored variation in diffusion by examining why some, but not all, 
autocratic regimes converge with repressive policies. This article examines this puzzle 
with a focus on the variation in the diffusion of repression against the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB thereafter) undertaken by authoritarian regimes2 across the Middle 
East after 2013.  
Following the 2011 Arab uprisings, the MB and its offshoots emerged as the main 
beneficiary of the destabilisation of several long-lived authoritarian regimes across the 
region. During the 2011 elections in Tunisia after the overthrow of Ben Ali, the Islamist 
movement won 40 per cent of the seats in the parliament, with the al-Nahda Party 
forming the first post-revolutionary government. In November 2011, the Justice and 
Development Party won 107 out of 395 parliamentary seats in Morocco. In 2012, the MB 
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in Egypt—represented by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)—won 46 per cent of the 
seats in the parliament. In 2012, the MB candidate Mohamed Morsi became the first 
democratically-elected president of Egypt. In Libya, the Islamists played a major role in 
the overthrow of Gadhafi and evolved into the primary actor during the transition 
period. In Yemen, the MB—predominant in the al-Islah party—emerged as the main 
beneficiary of the transition following the overthrow of President Saleh. 3  
Following a coup d’e tat that removed President Morsi from power, the military-
backed interim government in Egypt declared the MB to be a terrorist group on 25 
December 2013. This declaration had wide regional reverberations. Although the group 
had never been granted formal judicial authorisation for their decades-long political 
participation, it was to some degree accepted both by the regime and society since 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser until President Hosni Mubarak.4 The group was labelled 
neither a threat to national security nor a terrorist organisation. The regime’s claim that 
the country is facing an existential threat from the MB not only legalises repressive 
policies against the organisation but also enables mass mobilisation behind repression.5 
 As labelling the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation has been effective in 
mobilising Egyptians behind the harsh crackdown of the group, the Saudi Kingdom has 
adopted the same method to counteract the MB regionally.6 Since Iran’s Islamic 
Revolution (1979), the Saudi Kingdom had relied on a version of Sunni Islam to 
legitimise its regime. The rise of the MB to power in Egypt in the post-2011 order 
constituted a critical threat to the Kingdom’s distinctiveness.  The MB, offering an 
alternative narrative of Sunni Islam, constituted a source of identity risk to the Kingdom. 
The crackdown against the MB emerged as an opportunity structure for the Kingdom to 
reassert the superiority of its Islamic narrative.7  
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On 7 March 2014, the Kingdom designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist 
organisation alongside two other groups—the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—and attempted to form a regional coalition against the MB 
under the banner of fighting terrorism. The Kingdom exerted considerable pressure on 
other regimes to follow by declaring the group as terrorist. In November 2014, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) designated the Brotherhood local affiliates as terrorists. 
Despite Saudi pressure, Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait explicitly refused to do so. This 
article, then, investigates why some authoritarian regimes supported the designation of 
the MB as a terrorist organisation whereas others have resisted it despite Saudi 
pressure. This article sheds light on the dynamics leading to the diffusion of repression 
while focusing on the discrepancy in the recipient states’ autocratic (non-)convergence. 
While the literature has identified mechanisms of autocratic diffusion, this inner 
logic of diffusion remains subject of debate. Whereas some scholars argue that ideology 
inspires emulation leading to diffusion, others argue that authoritarian regimes are 
foremost driven by pragmatic self-interest related to regimes’ quest for survival. The 
diffusion of repression against the MB, I argue, provides a compelling case contributing 
to the ideology-interest debate. Although Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait share with Saudi 
Arabia the same regime type and converging regional interests in supporting the 
crackdown on the MB in Egypt, they varied paradoxically in adopting repression against 
the MB in their domestic spheres. These cases provide insights on the outcome rather 
than the mechanisms of diffusion. While the Saudi Kingdom emerged as an autocratic 
regional power adopting coercive mechanisms of autocratic diffusion, some recipient 
states followed its lead in designating the MB as terrorist whereas others resisted.  
I build on the assumption that states on the receiving side of diffusion are 
primarily driven by self-interest. Autocratic regime interest is not, however, one-
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dimensional. Instead, survival is the result of interaction between two dynamics: the 
regime’s regional interests in joining counter-revolutionary efforts and domestic 
authoritarian structures. This article argues that monocausal approaches to diffusion 
cannot capture the complexities of autocratic diffusion. It posits that IR approaches can 
bring novel insights enriching the research programme on the international diffusion of 
authoritarianism. Drawing on neoclassical realism (NCR) in IR theory, I propose a 
framework combining systemic structures at the regional level with domestic 
constraints, the interaction of which can explain the variation in the recipient states’ 
behaviour towards the MB. States’ convergence with regional repressive policies is the 
result of interaction between regime interest at the regional level—which is driven by 
the position of the state within the region as well as its dependency on a regional 
autocratic power for survival—and the regime’s relative autonomy vis-a -vis societal 
groups. If regimes enjoy relative autonomy vis-a -vis the society, they are likely to adopt 
repressive policies at the domestic level while pursuing their regional interests. When 
regimes are, however, less autonomous from societal groups, they are likely to take 
foreign policy decisions that might endanger their regional interests. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, I situate the topic within the scholarship 
on the diffusion of autocratic policies, identifying a lacuna in theorising why policies 
spread in some cases but not in others. I propose a theoretical framework combining 
variables from two levels of analysis: regime regional interest and the regime’s relative 
autonomy at the domestic level. Afterwards, I explore the role of Saudi Arabia as an 
autocratic regional power using coercive mechanisms in diffusing repressive policies 
against the MB. I, then, examine the convergence of the UAE with Saudi repressive 
policies against the Brotherhood and contrast it with the non-convergence in the cases 
of Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait. 
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Interest and Ideology in the Diffusion of Autocratic Policies 
The literature on the international dimensions of authoritarianism has adopted a 
number of concepts and mechanisms from the democratisation literature.8 One of these 
concepts is “diffusion,” which refers to the transmission of ideas, institutions, policies, or 
behaviour from one actor to another. Strang states that diffusion occurs when “prior 
adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for 
remaining non-adopters.”9Solingen presents a more detailed conceptualisation of 
diffusion as a process with four dimensions: (1) the stimuli, or a triggering event, (2) a 
medium, which is the context or milieu through which the initial stimuli may travel, (3) 
social agents affected by the stimuli, who aid or block the effects as they travel to other 
destinations, and (4) outcomes that enable differentiation between several degrees of 
diffusion.10   
The literature underlines various causal mechanisms of diffusion, including 
learning, emulation, persuasion, coercion, signalling, competition, socialisation, shaming, 
bargaining, and manipulation of utility calculations.11 This list reflects an implicit debate 
over the level of intentionality associated with diffusion. Some scholars, such as Elkins 
and Simmons, argue that diffusion is distinctive in that the prior adopter does not intend 
the export of policies or ideas to others. 12  Others focused on active coercive 
mechanisms—including imposition, coercion, and conditionality.13 This article takes a 
middle ground between these two positions. On the one hand, “change agents”14—or the 
stimuli in Solingen’s words—can intentionally seek to disseminate autocratic policies 
through vertical linkage. On the other, recipients are “social agents” who can block or 
allow this dissemination to travel.15  
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The literature has, however, concentrated on “diffusion” as a process rather than 
an outcome.16 Diffusion is seen as the process conducive to the spread particular 
policies, ideas, and behaviour. Hence, diffusion is not equivalent to “convergence,” that 
is, the increase in policy similarities across actors.17 Nevertheless, the literature has not 
provided a systematic explanation of the variation in (non-)convergence within the 
diffusion process.18 Despite the presence of similar mechanisms of diffusion, there is 
little knowledge as to why some actors adopt diffused policies whereas others refrain.  
The motives driving authoritarian regimes to adopt diffused policies are subject 
to disagreement. From a realist perspective, authoritarian regimes are rationalist actors 
driven by self-regarding interests. Henceforth, authoritarian regimes converge in their 
policies when they share similar threats. Odinius and Kuntz19 explain the conditions 
under which states decide to support fellow autocrats through counter-diffusion 
policies. Drawing on poliheuristic foreign policy analysis, they hypothesize that if 
regimes perceive the situation in other authoritarian countries as similar to their own 
domestic situation, they are likely to undertake policies shoring up those regimes. 
Henceforth, they explain why Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC thereafter) countries 
supported authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain while supporting 
revolutionary movements Libya and Syria. Weyland employs causal mechanisms based 
on bounded rationality to examine leaders’ perceptions of threat from revolutionary 
waves in Europe during the inter-war period and in Latin American during the 1960s 
and 1970s, which explains the spread of counter-diffusion policies in these cases.20 Yet, 
the designation of the MB in Egypt as a terrorist organisation and the diffusion of 
repression in the region challenges this realist perspective. Although Jordan, Kuwait, and 
Bahrain shared Saudi regional interests in overthrowing the MB in Egypt, they did not 
follow in adopting the terrorist designation in their own domestic spheres. 
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Other scholars argue that ideologies are the main drivers of state behaviour. 
Ideology is defined as “leaders’ preferences for ordering the political world, both 
domestically and internationally. Hence, ideologies are the idiosyncratic political 
principles and goals that leaders both value most highly and use to legitimate their claim 
to rule.”21 Some scholars argue that ideology is the driver behind the diffusion of 
autocratic policies. Vanderhill argues that ideological agreement as well as shared 
historical and cultural experiences affect the degree to which autocratic elites are 
receptive to external pressure for policy convergence.22 Accordingly, actors with 
ideological affinities are more likely to converge in their autocratic policies. The 
diffusion of repressive policies against the MB, however, challenges this argument. 
Although Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain share with Saudi Arabia a monarchical regime 
type, their ideological affinities have not led to a policy convergence towards the 
Brotherhood. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Qatar share strands of Sunni Islam. Yet, 
they diverged on policy choices towards the MB. 
In the remainder of this article, I present a theoretical framework to explain the 
variation in the recipient states’ convergence with Saudi policies. I argue that recipient 
countries are motivated by regime interest; that is, I highlight the interaction between 
regional and domestic constraints. I then explore how the Saudi Kingdom has played the 
role of an autocratic regional power in promoting repression against the MB threat 
through external pressure and enticement. I finally investigate how recipients have 
diverged between subsequent adopters and resisters.  
Explaining Autocratic (Non)convergence 
A Neoclassical Realist Approach 
The designation of the MB as a terrorist organisation across the region constitutes a 
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good illustration where autocratic diffusion has resulted in the convergence of 
repression in some cases but not in others. In order to unpack the decision-making 
process leading to convergence in repression, this section presents a theoretical 
framework that explores how regimes react when they are under pressure from 
regional powers to adopt repression in their domestic sphere.  
I propose a theoretical framework based on NCR, combining insights from IR 
theory and foreign policy analysis.23 Rose defines NCR as an approach that: 
explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematising 
certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope 
and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the 
international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is 
why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power 
capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must 
be translated through intervening variables at the unit level.24 
In examining the decision-making context in which authoritarian regimes decide 
whether to converge or not with the regional autocratic power, this framework 
combines three steps in a causal chain: material interests at the regional level 
(independent variable), domestic level structures (intervening variable), and policy 
choice (the outcome of diffusion). Hence, the behaviour of autocratic regimes, when 
faced with external pressures from a regional autocratic power, is the result of the 
interaction between: (1) the dependence on regional powers in the pursuit of regional 
interests and (2) the autonomy of the ruling elite from societal groups.  
The first stage in the argument is the relative power of the state within the region, 
which determines its responsiveness to external pressures. Autocratic regimes are 
driven by motives pertaining to security against threats within and without. Regime 
survival can be driven by geopolitical interests, such as maintaining the security of the 
state against external threats and preventing spillovers threatening domestic stability.25 
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Authoritarian regimes are seeking survival in an unfavourable regional environment, 
while facing external and internal threats. The regional structure provides states with 
opportunities and constraints and, hence, shapes their interests, which are related to the 
capabilities and the relative power distribution. Authoritarian regimes can depend on 
their own resources to secure their interests and survival, but they can rely on others 
through alliances and foreign aid.  
The second element in this causal chain is the domestic intervening variable, 
which specifies how systemic pressures are translated into policy choices. Although 
states may share converging interests at the regional level, they can undertake divergent 
foreign policy choices. The consideration of domestic processes as filters between 
systemic pressures and policy choices goes a long way towards explaining diffusion 
outcomes. I argue here that the structure of the governing coalition and the regime 
autonomy vis-a -vis domestic groups matter.26 Monarchies, like all authoritarian regimes, 
rest upon a winning coalition that is linking social constituencies to the ruling family. 
The regime autonomy, I argue, rests upon the institutional structure of the regime’s 
coalitional commitment. Different paths of state formation led to various institutional 
outcomes in the Middle East. 27 Whereas rulers can either supress or destroy opposition 
groups and maintain a very exclusive narrow coalition, as in Saudi Arabia. In other cases, 
the ruling elite is a broader, inclusive coalition, which allows social groups a limited 
freedom of manoeuvre in the political process, either in a weak parliament or a party 
system, as in Kuwait and Jordan. 
This regime relative autonomy can affect the pursuit of regional interests.28 
Regimes’ reaction to the diffusion of repression is the result of interaction between their 
regional interests and domestic structures. If regimes rest upon an exclusive ruling 
coalition allowing a relative autonomy vis-a -vis the society, they are likely to adopt 
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repression at the domestic level to ensure their regional interests. When regimes are, 
however, dependent on broader ruling coalition making them less autonomous vis-a -vis 
the society, they are likely to resist the diffusion of repression while risking their 
regional interests. Adopting repressive policies can endanger the coalitional 
commitment that guarantees the regime survival. In this case, the logic of regime 
survival is likely to take precedence over regional economic profits or interests. 
To illustrate this argument, I examine the cases of (non-)convergence of Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Jordan, and the UAE with Saudi repression towards the MB. The selection of the 
cases recipient of diffusion is based on the variation within the dependent variable (i.e. 
outcome of diffusion). Whereas Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan abstained from adopting 
repressive policies despite their linkage with the Saudi Kingdom, the UAE followed the 
Saudi path. To unpack the intervening variables leading to various diffusion outcomes, I 
chose these cases as they share antecedent conditions—such as strong linkage with the 
Saudi Kingdom, the monarchical regime type, shared regional interest, and a domestic 
opposition constituted of MB offshoot. Hence, the case studies are “heuristic cases,” 29 
which are selected based on the variation in the dependent variable to serve the purpose 
of identifying the causal path leading to different outcomes. Other monarchies that did 
not share these initial conditions do not fit the scope of the study. Qatar, for example, 
challenged the Saudi Kingdom regionally and did not share the same regional interest in 
undermining the MB in Egypt. 
The following section examines the role of Saudi Arabia in pressuring other 
regimes to adopt repression against the MB in their own domestic spheres. I will then 
use this theoretical framework to examine how various states in the region responded to 
Saudi diffusion. 
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Saudi Arabia: An Aspiring Authoritarian Regional Power  
Following the overthrow of President Morsi,30 the military regime in Egypt legitimised 
its crackdown on the MB through portraying the group as radical, threatening the 
existence of the Egyptian state. On 24 July 2013, General al-Sissi stated that “[the MB] 
are some who want to take the country to a critical curve.”31 This narrative culminated 
with the formal designation of the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation on 25 
December 2013, which successfully mobilised the people behind the regime.32 On 7 
March 2014, the Saudi Kingdom declared the group to be a terrorist organisation. 33 This 
declaration had regional reverberations since the Saudi Kingdom aimed at building a 
coalition to eradicate the MB across the region. Despite the assumption that Saudi 
Arabia is promoting autocracy in the Middle East,34 its regional policies, especially in 
diffusing repression against the MB, fit what Tansey calls ‘democracy resistance’.35 This 
Saudi endeavour can be regarded as an act shaped by the combination of the Kingdom’s 
geopolitical interests and its fear of the rise of the MB as an ideological competitor in 
Egypt, threatening the Saudi acclaimed Sunni leadership in the region.  
Following the 2011 uprisings, Saudi Arabia emerged as the primary counter-
revolutionary force in the region.36 Saudi efforts in building a regional coalition against 
the MB under its leadership highlighted the Kingdom’s role as an aspiring regional 
power. The roots of this behaviour can be traced back to the pre-2011 period. Following 
the 2003 Iraq War, the regional balance of power demonstrated an unprecedented Arab 
weakness. Iraq’s military power faded, leaving a void that several countries competed to 
fill. Two regional blocs emerged. The first includes, on the one hand, the so-called 
“Resistance Axis” based on an alliance between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The 
second evolved as the Saudis attempted to bolster alliances with Jordan and Egypt to 
craft a countering axis, in response to what the Saudi Kingdom perceived as Iranian 
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ambitions.37 With the outbreak of the 2011 uprisings in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and 
Syria, and the on-going instability in Iraq, Riyadh found itself surrounded by instability. 
The Kingdom perceived its network of allies—upon which it relied to ensure its 
geopolitical interests—collapsing. The Saudis perceived the rise of the MB to power in 
Egypt as a threat to their claims of Sunni leadership.38 
Regime change, shifting alliance, and the prominence of non-state actors 
contributed to Saudi Arabia’s struggle to ensure that regional changes are serving its 
geopolitical interests.39 The Kingdom’s reliance on international allies to preserve its 
security and pursue its regional interests was also endangered. Since its foundation, the 
Kingdom relied on external powers for security—first the British, then the United States 
(US). Since 2011, the Saudis became convinced that the divergence between Riyadh and 
Washington over the intended post-2011 regional order has hindered the Kingdom’s 
regional interests. Following the US reluctance to intervene in Syria and their favourable 
policy toward Iran, the Kingdom discarded its traditional defence doctrine and 
attempted to rely on its own resources for security.40 As the US seemed to be moving 
along with an Iranian nuclear deal despite Saudi concerns, the Kingdom needed regional 
allies.  
Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia’s attempts to build regional coalitions under its 
leadership did not have the desired result. In the Gulf, the Saudis insisted on deepening 
the GCC unity and institutionalisation. On numerous occasions, the Saudis proposed the 
institutionalisation of an expanded, tighter union for the GCC under their command.41 
However, King Abdullah’s proposals for political integration in the Gulf collapsed in the 
face of Oman’s opposition and Kuwait’s reluctance. In December 2013, Oman opposed 
Saudi plans for a unified command structure for the armed forces of the six states.42 
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Kuwait refused to sign a GCC internal security pact, as it compromises its political 
liberalism and exceptional constitutional principles within the Gulf.43 The emergence of 
Qatari-Emirati animosity over Libya and the MB in Egypt made Saudi ambitions of 
leading a regional coalition unattainable.44  
The Saudi attempt to build new alliances under the Kingdom’s leadership to 
balance Iran also foundered.45 Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon exposed the 
Kingdom’s failure in acting as a regional power able to influence regional outcomes. 
Relying on its Islamic identity, the Kingdom sought to place itself at the centre of a 
regional coalition to counter its long-lived enemy, Iran. Despite this, all Gulf states except 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain approved the interim nuclear agreement between the US and 
Iran in November 2013. 46  Furthermore, Oman secretly hosted the preliminary 
negotiations between Iran and the US. Turkey, which seemed a natural member of a 
coalition against Iran, challenged the Saudi Kingdom’s policies towards the MB in Egypt. 
This disagreement over the MB made an alliance with Turkey unattainable. 
Henceforth, the Saudis saw in the coup d’e tat in Egypt an opportunity to overthrow 
the MB, and to form a regional coalition fostering the Kingdom’s supremacy in the 
region. As the Kingdom accumulated significant financial and military capabilities over 
the decades, it sought a more favourable regional balance of power based on “patron-
client” relationships.47 Accordingly, the Saudi Kingdom expanded its financial and 
military resources to support authoritarian regimes, who later became the Kingdom’s 
loyal allies. Noteworthy, Saudi efforts of authoritarian diffusion is driven by interests 
rather than an overarching ideological project. This logic is manifest in Saudi tactical 
shifts towards the MB in Yemen. In its war against the Houthis, the Saudis allied with 
other groups, including al-Islah party, an MB offshoot in Yemen.48  
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Using its financial capabilities to promote authoritarian survival, the Kingdom 
emerged as an authoritarian regional patron encouraging its clients to outlaw the 
Brotherhood in their respective countries, pursuing active and deliberate policies to 
achieve this outcome through enticements and pressure. In March 2014, Saudi Arabia 
withdrew its ambassador from Doha over anger at Qatar’s support for the MB.49 The 
Saudis exercised an unprecedented amount of pressure on Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, even 
the United Kingdom and France to criminalise the MB as terrorist.50  
Saudi efforts to spread repression against the MB across the region constituted a 
case of vertical diffusion pressuring other states to follow its lead. The Saudi built 
patron-client relationships with other authoritarian regimes through foreign aid 
(Jordan), military support (Bahrain), or linkage due to geographic proximity (Kuwait 
and the UAE). This process of autocratic diffusion resulted in policy convergence for 
some cases (UAE) but not for others (Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan). The next section 
examines how recipient states responded to this vertical diffusion. 
Autocratic (Non-)convergence 
Following the Saudi designation of the MB as terrorist, the UAE pronounced the 
Brotherhood’s local affiliates to be terrorist on 15 November 2014. In contrast, despite 
economic linkage and the convergence of interests with the strongest regional 
authoritarian power, Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait resisted the adoption of 
repressive policies against the MB at home. These cases highlight the interaction 
between regime interests and domestic constraints in varying diffusion outcomes.  
The UAE’s decision was driven by regional interests as well as domestic 
structures. In the past decade, changes in leadership led to substantial changes in the 
monarchy’s foreign behaviour. Although the founding ruler of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed, 
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relied on oil wealth to consolidate the confederation of the seven emirates, his son 
Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed developed a regional role for the UAE. The state emerged as 
a donor across the region,51 aiming at acquiring a regional status and a power projection 
force through bombing targets in Libya, participating in the air campaign against the 
Islamic State, and supporting the Syrian opposition against Bashar al-Assad.52 Moreover, 
the UAE acted as a Saudi ally in its rivalry with Iran. As Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed the 
UAE foreign minister stressed: “The UAE stands firmly with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
in opposition to any Iranian attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab 
states.”53  
Following the 2011 uprisings, this alliance between Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
manifested itself in Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, and Egypt. Joining Saudi Arabia in the 
repression of the MB contributed to the UAE’s regional interests, furthering its power 
and status. Since the overthrow of the MB in Egypt, the UAE emerged as one of the 
financial supporters of the al-Sissi’s regime, and the designation of the group as terrorist 
conforms to its regional interests. Although Sheikh Zayed tolerated the MB’s presence 
through the al-Islah group for decades, the group had little impact on the regime’s 
domestic legitimacy. Since 2013, the UAE organised a regional campaign against the MB, 
portraying it as a transnational threat to regional and domestic security. Furthermore, 
the UAE, alongside Saudi Arabia, exercised pressure over other countries to crack down 
on the MB, including the UK.54 In short, the UAE’s decision was far motivated by 
ideological animosity with the MB. Instead, its regional interests played the dominant 
role in the decision.  
In contrast, although Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan expressed their support for the 
al-Sissi repression of the MB, they resisted the emulation of repression at home. The MB 
has political offshoots across the Middle East, such as the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in 
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Jordan and the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) in Kuwait.55 Nevertheless, these 
regimes resisted the designation of their countries’ respective movements as terrorist. 
Bahrain 
With the protests in Manama in February 2011, the wave of uprisings calling for political 
reforms reached the first Gulf monarchy. Initially, the protestors represented a cross-
sectarian appeal against the regime. However, the regime portrayed these protests 
through a sectarian lens and branded them as Iranian attempts to destabilize the region. 
As the al-Khalifa regime was unable to suppress the protesters, it turned to the GCC for 
support. On 14 March 2011, Saudi Arabia sent 1200 armed forces personnel to Manama, 
who cleared the demonstrators from the Pearl roundabout. Furthermore, the Kingdom 
committed to the security of the al-Khalifa regime in the form of a US$ 500 million 
donation.56 
Since then, the relationship between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia became an ever 
closer alliance. In return for Saudi support, the al-Khalifa remains the Saudis’ strongest 
follower. Following their intervention, the regime survival depended on the flow of aid 
and military support from the Saudi Kingdom, which shaped Bahrain’s regional interest. 
Yet, this interest did not lead the Bahrainis to follow the Saudi lead in designating the 
MB’s local group as terrorist, an outcome driven by domestic considerations. Indeed, the 
MB in Bahrain, represented by the “Islamic Minbar,” constitutes a crucial ally to the al-
Khalifa regime. Alongside other Salafi groups, the Islamic Minbar joined a national unity 
front to stabilize the regime during the uprisings. Following the suppression of the 
opposition, the ruling family in Bahrain sought to strengthen its ties with Sunni Islamist 
movements, including the MB, to balance the so-called “Shiite” protests.  
As the Saudis called its ally to build a regional coalition against the Brotherhood, 
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Bahrain was torn between satisfying its external supporter and maintaining a domestic 
ally. This struggle was manifest in the public statements of Bahrain’s Foreign Minister 
Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa. Following the Saudi designation of the MB as terrorist, he 
commented that his government will not label the Islamic Minbar as a terrorist 
organisation. He distinguished between the international organisation and the local 
branch in Bahrain and explained that “the MB have a particular status in Bahrain.”57 As 
this statement led to Saudi disappointment, Bahrain’s foreign minister justified the 
regime’s position: “The Muslim Brotherhood movement is a global movement with a 
single approach and is spread throughout the world, and will be dealt with according to 
the law of each country and the covenants to which it is party.”58 Following Saudi 
pressure, Bahrain announced its support to the Saudis and the UAE in fighting the MB 
across the region. Foreign Minister Khalid al-Khalifa insisted in several tweets that 
Bahrain fully supported Saudi Arabia and the UAE, stressing that any threat to the GCC 
fellows was a threat to Bahrain. However, the al-Khalifa regime remained, however, 
unwilling to list the Islamic Minbar group as terrorist.59 It is therefore clear that 
Bahrain’s regional interest emerged from its linkage with the Saudi Kingdom, which 
guaranteed its regime survival, and the MB did not pose an ideological threat to the 
Bahraini regime. Nevertheless, the regime was willing to take a regional position against 
the MB elsewhere, just not at home. 
Jordan 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a small state endeavouring to survive domestic and 
regional threats.60 Jordan often relied on external economic and financial support from 
the Gulf states and the US. Jordan found its regional interests converging with the Gulf 
states in counterbalancing Iran and leading counter-diffusion policies against 
revolutionary changes in 2011 to maintain regional allies. Jordan’s constant need for 
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external aid and, therefore, affluent regional allies constituted a systemic pressure 
influencing its foreign and domestic policy choices. Although Jordan’s regional interests 
converged with Saudi ones in supporting the coup d’e tat in Egypt, the structure of the 
ruling coalition and its interaction with the local MB led to the country’s non-
convergence with repressive policies.  
Prior to the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, Jordan developed a strong coalition 
with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which was known as “the moderate axis” or the “Arab 
centre.”61 Following the uprisings in Egypt and Syria, Jordan attempted to foster 
alliances and security cooperation with the GCC. Between 2011 and 2013, over half a 
million refugees crossed the borders into Jordan to escape the Syrian war. For a 
resource-poor country, Jordan has experienced harsh economic constraints, namely, 
vast budget deficits as a result of the compliance with the International Monetary Fund, 
which led to riots in November 2012.62 For Jordan, maintaining the flow of cash coming 
from rich aid donors, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, became the priority for 
regime security.63 Therefore, the threat of an ideational diffusion from the MB did not 
constitute an ultimate threat, considering the internal weakness of the group. 
Jordan’s position toward the new regime in Egypt and the fall of the MB was 
delicate. On the one hand, Jordan’s interest was to maintain the Gulf aid while giving 
impetus to the new regime in Egypt to re-establish the so-called “moderate axis.” This 
interest was evident in King Abdullah II’s personal visit to Cairo after the ouster of 
President Morsi, endorsing the new regime and re-establishing a close relationship with 
Egypt.64 
Following Saudi and Emirati designations of the Brotherhood as a terrorist 
organisation, rumours spread that the two Gulf states pressured Jordan to adopt similar 
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repressive policies.65 Although such policies could satisfy Jordan’s regional interest, it 
would be costly to the country’s domestic stability. The structure of the ruling coalition 
and its inclusive nature allowing close relations with societal groups led to Jordan’s non-
convergence with Saudi repressive policies. Historically, the Jordanian MB—through 
their political party the Islamic Action Front (IAF)—acted as a “loyal opposition,” 
requesting reforms but generally co-opted by the royal palace until 1993.66 With the 
peace treaty with Israel, this implicit alliance collapsed. Despite the tension between the 
group and the regime, the monarchy gives the MB the space to operate alongside other 
societal groups.67 In March 2015, an internal crisis within the MB in Jordan led to the 
split of the group into two movements; some members of the group, led by Abdul-Majid 
Thunaibat, submitted an application to register an alternative MB in Jordan. In this crisis 
and with the rise of contending Salafi voices within the monarchy, the regime avoided 
weakening the MB and maintained a dialogue open with at least one of the movement’s 
branches.68 Any weakening of the existing Brotherhood could destabilize Jordan by 
prompting the rise of alternative movements that are less pragmatic and moderate.69 
The regime has therefore adopted a strategy combining integration and exclusion. 
Jordan did not follow the repressive policies adopted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. Nor did it integrate the group and engage with it political, as the Moroccan path. 
Declaring the MB as a terrorist organisation could benefit Jordan’s regional 
interests, but would risk its domestic stability by narrowing down its societal base and 
deepen the societal ethnic divide, i.e. between Palestinians and Transjordanians, which 
might lead to destabilising the regime. Therefore, the regime sought to please external 
donors by weakening the MB using other means without banning it. When the MB 
deputy leader Zaki Bani Arshid attacked the UAE’s decision to list the organisation as 
terrorist, the Jordanian authorities arrested him on the charge of “disrupting relations 
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with a foreign state.”70 The Jordanian authorities defend their actions by stressing the 
economic interests that bind Jordan to the UAE. 
Kuwait 
Although Kuwait is one of the major financial supporters of the military regime in Egypt, 
it explicitly refused to declare its own MB to be terrorist, calling the Saudi labelling of 
the group an “internal affair.”71 The local MB in Kuwait is represented by the al-Islah 
movement and its political wing, the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM, known by 
its Arabic acronym as Hadas). Emerging initially in the 1960s, it established itself as a 
political actor by winning seats in the parliament following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. The ICM has positioned itself as a bridge between liberals and hardline Salafis in 
the emirate.72 The emergence of this political activism was allowed by the nature of the 
seemingly participatory political system in Kuwait. 
 The overthrow of Morsi in Egypt and the crackdown on the MB across the region 
has reverberated in Kuwait. On the one hand, the ICM criticised the Kuwaiti government 
for supporting the military regime in Egypt, which created domestic divisions. Moreover, 
the ICM has been subject to criticism from politicians and public opinion in Kuwait. On 
the other hand, external pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE for Kuwait to join the 
coalition intensified. For example, the UAE arrested Brotherhood members accused of 
plotting against the ruling family and linked some prominent Kuwaitis to the arrested 
group, portraying the ICM as part of a regional movement rather than a mere Kuwaiti 
political actor.73 Still, although the regime in Kuwait, allied with Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE, supported the oppression of the MB in Egypt, it took a less repressive stance vis-a -
vis the local MB due to the latter’s involvement in politics and its implicit agreement 
with the regime to balance leftist and extremist Salafi groups since 1990. In short, the 
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IMC is an opposition movement whose presence and activity contribute to the 
legitimacy and survival of the al-Sabah regime and thus could not be sacrificed to please 
Saudi  ambitions.74 
Conclusion  
This article has problematised why autocratic diffusion of repression processes lead to 
policy convergence in some cases but not in others. The existing literature is divided 
between scholars focusing on the role of ideology and those focusing on interests as the 
primary driver of autocratic behaviour. This article presents a complex understanding of 
regime interests by exploring how authoritarian regimes are receptive to the diffusion of 
repression. From an IR perspective, neorealism argues that interests evolving from the 
regional environment shape states’ interests and, hence, policy choices regardless of 
regime type and domestic factors. The increasing abandonment of such an extreme 
stance allowed a fruitful engagement between IR and Comparative Politics. This article 
has demonstrated that diffusion of repression is a dynamic process in which 
authoritarian regime’s interests are in constant interaction between its position in the 
regional structure and its domestic structure enabling or constraining the pursuit of this 
interest regionally. It thus shows that variations in diffusion outcomes require a multi-
level analysis, including systemic and domestic factors. Henceforth, neoclassical realism 
constitutes a fertile ground for theory development to examine how autocratic policies 
operate at regional and international levels.  
The cases of Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait show that the interactive dynamics of 
regional interests and domestic structures led to distinct patterns of behaviour in 
reaction to regional pressures from the Saudi Kingdom. All three regimes had interests 
in supporting the authoritarian regime in Egypt, such as regional alliances in the case of 
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Jordan or fear of revolution as in the cases of Kuwait and Bahrain. Domestic structures, 
however, functioned as intervening variables making the pursuit of regime interests at 
the regional level permissible in the case of the UAE but unbearable in the cases of 
Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait. 
These empirical cases make several contributions to the existing literature on the 
international dimensions of authoritarianism. First, whereas scholars have broadly 
addressed diffusion as an unintentional process, the case of Saudi Arabia provides novel 
insights on diffusion as a vertical process involving external pressure. Second, the non-
convergence of Saudi clients to the Kingdom’s diffusion efforts showed that diffusion is a 
process where senders and recipients are independent agents able to influence its 
outcome. Henceforth, this article moved beyond the study of diffusion as a mechanism. 
Instead, diffusion is a process involving both active senders and, crucially, active 
recipients. Third, the cases of Bahrain and Jordan, in particular, show that economic 
linkage does not necessarily lead to diffusion. Despite their dependence on Saudi aid 
both Bahrain and Jordan resisted Saudi external pressure. Fourth, this study illuminates 
other cases of diffusion of autocratic policies, such as the military intervention in Yemen, 
where Gulf states joined the Saudi-led coalition except Oman. Also, the argument sheds 
light on the diffusion of repression against Shiite communities across the region. 
In conclusion, the analysis of diffusion of repression in the Middle East politics 
has theoretical relevance that goes beyond the diffusion literature. It shows that a 
serious engagement between IR and Comparative Politics can lead to theory 
development. On the one hand, a close examination of authoritarian behaviour at the 
intersection of regional and domestic levels provides enlightens authoritarian foreign 
behaviour. On the other hand, the literature on autocratic diffusion can benefit from the 
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mid-range theories developed within IR presenting a more nuanced understanding of 
the ideology versus interest debate. 
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Country Muslim Brotherhood Movement 
Egypt MB 
Political wing: The Freedom and Justice 
Party 
Tunis Al-Nahda Party 
Kuwait Al-Islah movement 
Its political wing: Islamic Constitutional 
Movement (ICM) 
Jordan The Islamic Action Front (IAF) 
UAE Al-Islah Movement 
Bahrain The Islamic Minbar 
Yemen MB is a dominant group within Al-Islah 
Party 
 
Figure (1): The MB and their offshoots in the Arab world75 
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